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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issues regula-
tions, the violation of which can result in the FCC seeking forfeiture -
"the divestiture of property without compensation."' Courts are cur-
rently split regarding the jurisdiction of district courts to entertain con-
stitutional challenges to these regulations when raised as affirmative
defenses in forfeiture actions under the Communications Act of 1934.2
The Act sets up a jurisdictional structure for review of FCC actions.
Three provisions are of interest here: 47 USC §§ 402, 504, and 510.
The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ny proceed-
ing to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the [FCC]" un-
der § 402.2 The federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
forfeiture proceedings under §§ 504 and 510.' Unfortunately, the Act's
jurisdictional grants are notably complicated, and it is unclear whether
district court forfeiture jurisdiction extends to constitutional defenses
that implicate the validity of an FCC order?
In 2000, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits disagreed over whether
district court forfeiture jurisdiction extended to constitutional chal-
lenges to regulations raised as defenses ("constitutional defenses")
during a forfeiture proceeding. It is important to emphasize that the
split is about constitutional challenges to the FCC directives underly-
ing the forfeiture action and not constitutional challenges to either
t BA 2007, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2013, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 Black's Law Dictionary 722 (West 9th ed 2009).
2 Pub L No 73-416, 48 Stat 1064, codified as amended at 47 USC § 151 et seq.
3 47 USC § 402(a). As explained in Part I.D.3, "orders" has been interpreted to encom-
pass FCC rules and regulations.
4 47 USC §§ 504(a), 510(b). See also Prayze FM v FCC, 214 F3d 245, 250 (2d Cir 2000)
(stating that § 504 "confers on the district courts jurisdiction to hear in rem forfeiture suits");
United States v Evergreen Media Corporation of Chicago, AM, 832 F Supp 1183, 1184, 1186
(ND I11 1993) (same).
5 See Action for Childrens Television v FCC, 827 F Supp 4, 10 (DDC 1993) (lamenting the
"maze of jurisdictional rules governing the review of FCC matters" as "difficult to navigate").
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the forfeiture action itself (for example, that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment) or the statute. In United States v Any and All
Radio Station Transmission Equipment' ("Laurel Avenue"), the
Eighth Circuit found that district courts lack jurisdiction over such
defenses.' In United States v Any and All Radio Station Transmission
Equipment ("Maquina Musical"), the Sixth Circuit found that dis-
trict courts have jurisdiction.' While other circuits have discussed the
issue, none has fully committed to either approach." Ultimately, the
solutions presented are either too blunt or too confused to resolve
this issue-the courts have brought a sledgehammer to surgery.
The Act's jurisdictional provisions demand no particular solu-
tion. These provisions do not discuss defenses and provide no guid-
ance on how courts should deal with them. Although § 402 grants ex-
clusive jurisdiction to the appellate courts to review the validity of
FCC regulations, a hyper-literal reading that drew from this fact the
conclusion that district courts may not hear constitutional defenses is
in conflict with the robustly supported intuition that Congress is un-
likely to grant forfeiture jurisdiction to the district courts while de-
priving them of jurisdiction over constitutional defenses raised dur-
ing those actions." To simply begin and end with § 402 is to ignore
both the specific grant of forfeiture jurisdiction to district courts
(§§ 504 and 510) and the intuitions that accompany the defenses at
issue. Ultimately, the language and structure of the Act provide little
guidance to resolve the split and, instead, indicate that the jurisdic-
tional provisions are in tension.
This Comment resolves the tension. It argues that district courts
have jurisdiction to hear constitutional defenses to FCC directives, but
only as-applied defenses and not facial defenses. That is, defendants
cannot, as a defense, challenge the wholesale constitutionality of FCC
directives. They can, however, raise constitutional defenses as to the
application of those directives in the forfeiture proceeding. This ap-
proach is supported by the language and structure of the Act. Analo-
gous case law also suggests that splitting the defenses satisfies the de-
mand of the appellate court jurisdictional grant without overly
6 207 F3d 458 (8th Cir 2000).
7 Id at 463.
8 204 F3d 658 (6th Cir 2000).
9 Id at 665.
10 See Part II.C.
11 See generally Courtney J. Lin, International Asset Forfeiture and the Constitution: The
Limits of Forfeiture Jurisdiction over Foreign Assets under 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(2), 31 Am J
Crim L 251 (2004) (discussing constitutional issues in the context of forfeiture and district court
jurisdiction).
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circumscribing the district court jurisdictional grant. This interpreta-
tion gives weight to the complexity and nuance of the jurisdictional
provisions, ensuring that neither jurisdictional grant unduly limits the
extent of the other. Further, the resolution balances the concerns of
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits by ensuring the ability to defend consti-
tutional rights while preventing forfeiture defendants from improperly
using the district courts to strike down regulations. Finally, this solu-
tion brings much needed clarification to the jurisdictional provisions.
This Comment is divided into three parts. Part I discusses forfei-
ture in general and its application within the Act in particular. Part I
discusses the two main sources of the current split and related deci-
sions reached by other circuits. Part III presents an analysis of the
statutory provisions and the solution.
I. FORFEITURE, JURISDICTION, AND THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
This Part describes the history and mechanics of forfeiture, the
general grant of jurisdiction over forfeitures, and the Act's forfeiture
and jurisdictional provisions. The goal is to provide a basic back-
ground on these subjects in order to give context to the circuit split
and the solution presented in Part III.
A. The Form of Forfeiture
The circuit split at issue implicates civil forfeiture -civil actions
to obtain control of property. The two primary cases involve civil in
rem forfeiture, but other forms of forfeiture arise in similar cases.
Civil in rem forfeiture is an action against the property itself.12
Important aspects of in rem forfeiture are illustrated by Laurel Ave-
nue. The first aspect of the case to notice is the caption. The defendant
is the equipment itself: "Any and All Radio Station Transmission
Equipment; Radio Frequency Power Amplifiers, Radio Frequency
Test Equipment, and any other equipment associated with or used in
connection with the transmission at 97.7 MHZ, located [at] 1400 Lau-
rel Avenue, Apartment 1109, Minneapolis, MN 55403."'" When Alan
Fried, the equipment owner, refused to cease his unauthorized broad-
casting, the Government initiated an in rem forfeiture action in the
federal district court for Minnesota under § 510.14 The magistrate judge
issued a warrant of arrest and notice, and the US Marshal "arrest[ed]
12 See Note, Fifth Amendment: Double Jeopardy Clause-In Rem Civil Forfeiture, 110
Harv L Rev 206, 208 (1996).
13 Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 458.
14 Id at 459-60.
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the radio equipment" after notice was given. 5 In response, Fried
sought restoration of the equipment and filed an answer to the Gov-
ernment's initial complaint." This scenario illustrates several key as-
pects of a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding: statutory authorization of
the forfeiture, filing an action against the property itself, and seizure of
the property during the forfeiture proceeding.
In some cases, however, the Government pursues civil in perso-
nam forfeiture, which involves an action against a specific person.'7
The Government sues an individual under a particular statute to re-
cover property associated with the statutory violation. For example,
the FCC's pursuit of monetary forfeiture is a form of in personam for-
feiture." The FCC generally issues notice to inform a statutory violator
of what the violator might owe. After issuing notice, the FCC pro-
ceeds to impose the forfeiture. If the violator does not comply with the
demand, the FCC sues the violator in district court." This example il-
lustrates two key facets of in personam forfeiture: filing against the
person and no seizure of the property during the proceeding.
Additionally, an agency will sometimes pursue administrative
forfeiture. This action is simply a forfeiture proceeding that is con-
ducted through mechanisms internal to the agency rather than
through the courts. °
B. A Brief History of Forfeiture
As suggested by the opening examples, forfeiture is a way of at-
taining title to property that has been used "in a manner contrary to
the laws of the sovereign."'" It is "the divestiture of property without
compensation" in which "[t]itle is instantaneously transferred to [the
government]." 2 The government cannot use this power arbitrarily,
however-it has traditionally been constrained to instances where the
15 Id at 460.
16 Id.
17 See Note, 110 Harv L Rev at 208 (cited in note 12).
18 See 47 USC § 503(b)(1).
19 See Action For Children's Television v FCC, 59 F3d 1249, 1253-54 (DC Cir 1995);
United States v Ganley, 300 F Supp 2d 200, 202 (D Me 2004) (explaining that the FCC has au-
thority to issue forfeitures and that uncollected amounts from forfeiture orders can be recov-
ered in civil actions).
20 See Dee R. Edgeworth, Asset Forfeiture: Practice and Procedure in State and Federal
Courts 3-4 (ABA 2d ed 2008). See also 47 USC § 503(b)(3)(A)-(B) (setting up a procedure for
FCC administrative forfeiture actions).
21 Edgeworth, Asset Forfeiture at 1 (cited in note 20).
22 Black's Law Dictionary at 722 (cited in note 1).
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"laws of the sovereign" have been violated. In the modem era, forfei-
ture requires statutory authorization.'
As noted, the forfeiture actions discussed in this Comment are
civil forfeitures, of which there are two types. ' The first is civil in rem
forfeiture, which is an action against the property based "upon the
fiction that inanimate objects themselves can be guilty of wrongdo-
ing." The legal proceedings arising from this fiction often bear odd
captions, such as United States v 144,774 Pounds of Blue King Crab."
The second is civil in personam forfeiture, which is "brought against
a person for the assets acquired or maintained through the conduct
giving rise to the forfeiture.""
The basic fiction underlying civil forfeiture has a long history. It
is mentioned in Plato's Laws, where he discusses an object in the pol-
ity that would "on conviction.., be cast beyond the frontier" if that
object killed a man.' The laws of medieval England required that
certain items of property be surrendered to the authorities "for ret-
ribution" if they caused harm to a person." Eventually, this quasi-
superstitious concept morphed into the law of deodand, "a thing for-
feited.., for the good of the community."3' For example, if a person
was run over by a barrel, the "community" (meaning the king) con-
fiscated the object as a deodand. This practice was transferred to the
American colonies but fell into disuse after occasional application in
the eighteenth century.
While the core concept underlying civil forfeiture is found in the
law of deodand, the legal structure owes more to English commercial
23 See United States v Lane Motor Co, 199 F2d 495, 496-97 (10th Cir 1952).
24 More broadly, judicial forfeiture-forfeiture involving formal court action-is split
into civil forfeiture and criminal forfeiture. Criminal forfeiture is an action filed against a spe-
cific alleged wrongdoer in connection with a criminal investigation.
25 United States v United States Coin & Currency, 401 US 715, 719-20 (1971).
26 410 F3d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir 2005) (involving forfeiture action by the United States
against "the defendant 144,774 pounds of cooked, frozen blue king crab").
27 Edgeworth, Asset Forfeiture at 11 (cited in note 20).
28 Plato, Laws 624a, 873e-874a, in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds, The Col-
lected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters 1225, 1433 (Princeton 2002) (A.E. Taylor,
trans). See also Leonard W. Levy, A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property 1-20 (North
Carolina 1996).
29 Levy, License to Steal at 10-11 (cited in note 28) (noting that the property would be
surrendered if an accidental homicide occurred, even if the owner exercised reasonable care in
controlling the property).
30 Id at 7, 11-13 (explaining that the value of the deodand was forfeited to the crown and
that deodand was an important source of revenue).
31 Id at 13-19.
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law.2 Specifically, civil forfeiture is an outgrowth of forfeiture pro-
ceedings against "guilty" vessels based on authorization from trade
and navigation statutes?3 The pre-revolutionary admiralty courts
used such forfeiture proceedings to enforce the laws that England
imposed on the American colonies and to prevent "revenue evasion
schemes."' In these proceedings a "vessel whose guilt was suspected
would be arrested and prosecuted by name," and the "law treated
the ship as if it were alive, a guilty person."35 By proceeding against
the ship, the courts were often able to sidestep thorny questions re-
garding jurisdiction over the ship owners.' Despite the use of forfei-
ture to enforce some hated laws of the era, the idea of using statuto-
rily granted "in rem confiscation proceedings in which ... the
offending object is the defendant" to proceed with a forfeiture has
remained vital in American law."
Today, civil forfeiture is a "creature of statute" and cannot be
employed unless "authorized by an applicable statute."" Importantly,
many agencies have been granted the power to pursue forfeiture."'
For example, in addition to the FCC's civil forfeiture power, the Na-
tional Park Service, 1 the Environmental Protection Agency, 2 and the
Food and Drug Administration3 all have statutory grants allowing
them to seek forfeiture.
32 See Charles Doyle, Crime and Forfeiture 3 (Congressional Research Service May 9,
2007), online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-139.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2012). See also
Levy, License to Steal at 39 (cited in note 28).
33 See Levy, License to Steal at 39-47 (cited in note 28).
34 Doyle, Crime and Forfeiture at 3 (cited in note 32).
35 Levy, License to Steal at 43 (cited in note 28).
36 Id (observing that proceeding against the vessel was easier because the owners of the
vessels were often unknown, unavailable, or out of the court's jurisdiction).
37 Doyle, Crime and Forfeiture at 3 (cited in note 32) (emphasis omitted).
38 Id at 4.
39 Lane Motor, 199 F2d at 497.
40 See Doyle, Crime and Forfeiture at 66-73 (cited in note 32) (listing the federal forfei-
ture statutes).
41 See 16 USC § 128 ("All guns, traps, teams, horses, or means of transportation... used
by any person ... when engaged in killing, trapping, ensnaring, or capturing [certain animals]
shall be forfeited to the United States.").
42 See 33 USC § 1415(b)(2) (granting forfeiture authority over property associated with
criminal penalties and over vessels associated with statutory violations).
43 See 21 USC § 467b (granting authority for the seizure of poultry products that are
misbranded, adulterated, or that otherwise violate of specified statutory provisions).
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C. General Forfeiture Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over forfeitures has been explicitly prescribed since
the early days of the Republic," rather than simply being packed into
general federal question jurisdiction." In 1948, Congress granted the
district courts general jurisdiction over actions involving the "recovery
or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or other-
wise, incurred under any Act of Congress, except matters within the
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade."' Section 1355 of Ti-
tle 28 controls when a government entity is granted forfeiture power,'
but the entity's authorizing statute fails to specify the jurisdictional de-
tails. Additionally, particular grants of forfeiture power to agencies
can also have specific jurisdictional components that exist alongside
the general grant.'
D. FCC Forfeiture Jurisdiction
The Communications Act grants forfeiture jurisdiction to the
federal district courts." The statutory framework for forfeiture pro-
ceedings is provided for in 47 USC §§ 503,504, and 510."
Section 503 outlines the circumstances under which monetary for-
feiture can be pursued. These include situations in which a violator
"willfully or repeatedly fail[s] to comply substantially with the terms
and conditions of any license, permit, certificate, or other instrument
or authorization issued by the [FCC]" or "willfully or repeatedly fail[s]
to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter or of any rule,
regulation, or order issued by the [FCC]."'1 Section 510 outlines the
circumstances in which the FCC can pursue the forfeiture of "[a]ny
44 See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, ch 20. 1 Stat 73, 76-77 (granting the federal courts juris-
diction over forfeitures under the "laws of impost, navigation or trade"); Levy, License to Steal
at 46-57 (cited in note 28).
45 Compare 28 USC § 1355, with 28 USC § 1331. Forfeiture jurisdiction was originally
granted separately from general federal question jurisdiction and continues to be granted sepa-
rately today. In fact, forfeiture jurisdiction originated long before federal question jurisdiction.
See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revi-
sion Project, 31 UC Davis L Rev 855, 921-22 (1998).
46 Pub L No 80-773, 62 Stat 869,934 (1948), codified as amended at 28 USC § 1355(a).
47 See United States v $13,963.00, More or Less, in United States Currency, 793 F Supp 2d
809, 813 (SD W Va 2011).
48 See, for example, 21 USC § 881 (providing additional requirements for certain forfei-
tures made pursuant to the Food and Drug Act); 26 USC § 7323 (providing additional re-
quirements for the judicial enforcement of seizures imposed under the Internal Revenue
Code).
49 See Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 463.
50 Section 507 also discusses forfeiture, but it is a specialized provision that addresses vio-
lations of the Great Lakes Agreement.
51 47 USC § 503(b)(1).
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electronic, electromagnetic, radio frequency, or similar device, or
component thereof." 2 Sections 504(a) and 510 set out how a forfeiture
action can be brought in court and establish jurisdiction over those
proceedings.
1. Section 504(a) -granting the district courts jurisdiction over
FCC forfeitures.
Section 504(a) provides,
The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into
the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable, ex-
cept as otherwise provided with respect to a forfeiture penalty de-
termined under section 503(b)(3) of this title, in a civil suit in the
name of the United States brought in the district where the per-
son or carrier has its principal operating office or in any district
through which the line or system of the carrier runs: Provided,
That any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to
the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo.3
Essentially, under § 504(a) the federal district courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over FCC forfeitures and such suits are tried de novo.
The one minor qualification is the clause referring to
§ 503(b)(3). The referenced section grants the FCC discretion to
provide a person with a hearing "before the [FCC] or an administra-
tive law judge" prior to proceeding with forfeiture, and it channels
such optional proceedings down a separate jurisdictional path.4 Sec-
tion 503(b)(3) carves out a separate procedure for when the FCC
chooses to grant a hearing prior to forfeiture. The provision is purely
optional, however. As such, this provision provides the FCC with al-
ternate means of pursuing forfeiture but does not restrict the jurisdic-
tional grant found in § 504."
52 47 USC § 510(a).
53 47 USC § 504(a).
54 47 USC § 503(b)(3)(A) (allowing administrative hearings, followed by an option for
appellate review of any forfeiture penalty determinations pursuant to § 402(a)).
55 See Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 79 Colum L Rev 1435, 1452-53 (1979) (noting that § 504(b)(3) gives the
FCC discretion to utilize an "alternative procedure" involving an administrative hearing). See
also Prayze FM v FCC, 214 F3d 245, 250 (2d Cir 2000) (stating that § 504 "confers on the district
courts jurisdiction to hear in rem forfeiture suits"); United States v Northeast Communications of
Wisconsin, Inc, 608 F Supp 2d 1049, 1053 (ED Wis 2008) (noting that § 504 grants exclusive juris-
diction to district courts to hear actions regarding unpaid forfeitures); United States v Evergreen
Media Corporation of Chicago, AM, 832 F Supp 1183, 1184-86 (ED I11 1993) (stating § 504(a)
gives district courts jurisdiction to hear suits for the recovery of forfeitures).
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2. Section 510(b)-a method for bringing in rem forfeitures.
Section 510(b) provides,
Any property subject to forfeiture to the United States under
this section may be seized by the Attorney General of the Unit-
ed States upon process issued pursuant to the supplemental
rules for certain admiralty and maritime claims by any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction over the property,
except that seizure without such process may be made if the sei-
zure is incident to a lawful arrest or search."
This provision clarifies that district courts have particular authority
over in rem forfeiture. Importantly, it also sets up the process
whereby a court can begin to exercise that jurisdiction.
Sections 504 and 510 complement each other.7 Section 504's ju-
risdictional language is extremely broad and encompasses all the
"forfeitures provided for in [the] chapter."'" Section 510 reinforces
the district court's jurisdiction over civil in rem forfeiture actions and
provides a particular method for those actions. 9
3. Section 402-giving appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to
invalidate final orders of the FCC.
The Act also provides a broad grant of jurisdiction to the appel-
late courts to review "final orders" of the FCC. Section 402(a) pro-
vides that "[a]ny proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any
order of the [FCC] under this chapter... shall be brought as provided
by and in the manner prescribed in chapter 158 of title 28."" The rele-
vant provision in chapter 158 is found at 28 USC § 2342:" "The court
56 47 USC § 510(b).
57 See, for example, Prayze, 214 F3d at 250 (stating that § 504 "confers on the district
courts jurisdiction to hear in rem forfeiture suits"); Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 460-63 (explain-
ing that the "federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear forfeiture suits" under
§ 504 in an action brought under § 510). But see Northeast Communications of Wisconsin, 608
F Supp 2d at 1053-54 (distinguishing between the jurisdictional grants found in § 504 and
§ 510).
58 47 USC § 504(a). See also Action for Childrens Television v FCC, 827 F Supp 4, 10
(DDC 1993) (stating that the "the District Court has jurisdiction over [FCC] forfeiture en-
forcement actions" and citing § 504(a)).
59 See United States v Any and All Radio Station Equipment, 93 F Supp 2d 414, 417
(SDNY 2000) (noting that § 510 forfeiture actions have specific requirements and can be
brought alone or in conjunction with § 503 forfeiture actions).
60 47 USC § 402(a).
61 This provision was originally enacted as § 4(e) of the Hobbs Act, Pub L No 89-554, 80
Stat 378, 622 (1966). See CE Design, Ltd v Prism Business Media, Inc, 606 F3d 443, 448 (7th
Cir 2010).
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of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend
(in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of... all final orders
of the [FCC] made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47."'2 Addi-
tionally, § 402(b) provides that "[a]ppeals may be taken from decisions
and orders of the [FCC] to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia" in prescribed circumstances.'
The words "order" and "final orders" are not paragons of lucidity.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc v United States' strongly suggests
that the phrase "final orders" should be broadly construed to cover a
range of FCC actions, including the promulgation of rules and regula-
tions.' The Court held that "it is the substance of what the [FCC] has
purported to do and has done which is decisive" for the purposes of
§ 402(a), rather than the particular label given to the action.' To that
end, the Court fo und that those orders that "promulgat[e] regulations"
that "affect or determine rights generally even though not directed to
any particular person or corporation" are reviewable. 7
Courts have read Columbia Broadcasting System for the propo-
sition that "a substantive rule .. . is a final order" under § 402(a).'
Secondary sources also take this broad interpretation of § 402(a) as a
given.' The heavy weight of precedent thus indicates that the provi-
sion gives appellate courts jurisdiction over challenges to rules and
regulations.
In general, to invoke the appellate review discussed above, a
party must "first petition[ ] the FCC to reconsider the rule" or
"seek[] some kind of remedy from the agency."" That is, the appel-
late courts have jurisdiction over challenges to regulations, but a par-
ty that wishes to invoke that jurisdiction generally must first go
through the FCC. There are, however, certain situations in which a
62 28 USC § 2342.
63 47 USC § 402(b).
64 316 US 407 (1942).
65 Id at 415-25.
66 Idat416.
67 Id at 417.
(8 City of Peoria v General Electric Cablevision Corp (GECCO), 690 F2d 116, 119 (7th
Cir 1982) (citing Columbia Broadcasting System for the proposition that a substantive FCC
rule is a final order under § 402(a) and stating that review of such orders may only be brought
in a court of appeals). See also Gottlieb v Carnival Corp, 635 F Supp 2d 213, 220 (EDNY 2009)
(noting that "an order promulgating rules and regulations is an 'order' under § 402(a)" and
listing cases).
69 See, for example, Michael Botein, Judicial Review of FCC Action, 13 Cardozo Arts &
Enter L J 317, 334 (1995) (describing § 402(a) as the main path for review of "rulemaking ac-
tions, policy statements, declaratory rulings, and a wide variety of other decisions").
70 GECCO, 690 F2d at 119. See also 47 USC § 405; Laurel A venue, 207 F3d at 463.
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party can directly file a petition for review with the circuit court
without going through the FCC.7' Regardless of the method for in-
voking appellate jurisdiction-whether direct or indirect-parties
dissatisfied with an FCC directive cannot simply go to the district
court with a direct challenge. They must seek judicial review in the
appellate courts.
Taken as a whole, a tension in the language of the Communica-
tion Act emerges. On the one hand, district courts have jurisdiction
over all forfeiture cases. But, on the other hand, circuit courts have
jurisdiction to decide that a rule or regulation is invalid. Left unclear
is the status of constitutional defenses in forfeiture cases-are district
courts unable to hear such defenses?
While jurisdictional confusion is a larger issue for the Act, it is
especially troubling in the context of forfeiture. Uncertainty concern-
ing the boundaries of district court forfeiture jurisdiction can signifi-
cantly impair a defendant's fight against the FCC. Defendants who
raise arguments over which the court has no jurisdiction stand to lose
their assets without the opportunity to present a full defense. The
FCC forfeiture provisions might not be unique within the realm of
federal forfeiture, but they raise a host of uniquely confusing juris-
dictional issues. That forfeiture involves an imposition on fundamen-
tal property rights only heightens the importance of bringing clarity
to these issues.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The appellate courts have divided over whether district courts
have jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to regulations
brought as affirmative defenses to FCC forfeiture actions. As noted,
47 USC § 402 provides that the appellate courts have exclusive juris-
diction over challenges to final orders of the FCC, but 47 USC
§§ 503, 504, and 510 indicate that the district courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over FCC forfeiture actions. The Eighth Circuit has
found that the district courts lack jurisdiction to hear such defenses
in forfeiture cases. The Sixth Circuit has found that district courts
have jurisdiction to hear such defenses. Other circuits have not taken
firm stands.
71 See GECCO, 690 F2d at 119 (implying that a party seeking review of a rule can obtain
appellate review directly if it was also a party to the FCC's rulemaking proceeding). See also 47
USC § 405(a).
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A. The Eighth Circuit
In Laurel Avenue, the court found that the district court lacked
the power to hear constitutional defenses to FCC forfeiture actions.72
Instead, it found that that power is vested exclusively with the appel-
late courts.73
As with all in rem forfeiture cases, the defendant was the equip-
ment itself. Alan Fried, the owner, submitted the answer to the com-
plaint and advanced a variety of affirmative defenses. Fried was a mi-
crobroadcaster- an operator of a "low-wattage radio station[] without
licensing approval from the FCC."' After warning Fried of his viola-
tion, the FCC initiated forfeiture proceedings." Following the seizure
of his equipment, Fried "raised several affirmative defenses challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the microbroadcasting regulations.""7 In
particular, "Fried argued . .. that the FCC regulations barring new li-
censes to microbroadcasters violated the First Amendment, equal pro-
tection and due process.""4 Ultimately, the district court granted judg-
ment on the pleadings to the government." Fried had argued that the
district court had "exclusive jurisdiction over the forfeiture action, in-
cluding the merits of his constitutional challenges" under § 504(a)."'
The district court, however, decided that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
his constitutional defenses. 1
On appeal, Fried argued that § 504's reference to a trial de novo
"contemplates adjudication of all issues raised in the forfeiture ac-
tion, including any and all defenses." 2 Additionally, Fried contended
that this provision "overrides 47 U.S.C. § 402, which is a general ju-
risdictional provision.""' The government argued that Fried should
not be allowed to shoehorn constitutional challenges properly within
appellate court jurisdiction into forfeiture actions.'
72 Laurel A venue, 207 F3d at 463.
73 Id.
74 Id at 460.
75 Id at 459.
76 Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 460.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id at 461.
80 Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 461.
81 Id.
82 Id at 462.
83 Id.
84 Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 461. The Government argued that the proper path for Fried
was to seek a waiver from the FCC and bring his challenges there. See id at 462. It is important to
clarify that the statute itself does not compel a particular path for waivers from a particular di-
rective. Instead, the waiver power is created and articulated by the FCC's regulations. See 47
CFR § 1.3 (stating that waivers can be granted, in whole or in part, "for good cause shown").
1564 [79:1553
Forfeiture Jurisdiction under the Communications Act
Initially, the Eighth Circuit overturned the district court's hold-
ing on appeal' On rehearing, however, the Eighth Circuit changed
course and affirmed the district court's holding on jurisdiction. While
it explained its new reasoning, the court did not explain why it re-
versed itself. Indeed, the court found that no binding authority was
directly applicable, giving it "a certain leeway in its interpretation of
the jurisdictional provisions of the Federal Communications Act."'
The court took advantage of this leeway, relying on a mixture of
persuasive authority, statutory construction, and policy. Before
reaching its analysis, the court began by implicitly questioning
Fried's motives, stating "[w]here exclusive jurisdiction is mandated
by statute, a party cannot bypass the procedure by characterizing its
position as a defense to an enforcement action." 7 With this intuition
in the background, the court looked at the Communications Act. It
concluded that the statute provides circuit courts with exclusive ju-
risdiction to review challenges to FCC regulations: "It is hard to
think of clearer language confining the review of regulations to the
Courts of Appeal."'
The court also relied on precedent. First, it looked to the Su-
preme Court's decision in FCC v ITT World Communications, Inc,9
which held that a defendant may not evade the exclusive jurisdiction
of the appellate courts by seeking to enjoin a final order of the FCC
in a district court."' Second, bolstered by its own precedent,91 the
court declared that a "defensive attack on the FCC regulations is as
much an evasion of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
as is a preemptive strike by seeking an injunction."'' Finally, the
court mentioned three policy arguments justifying its construction of
the statute, namely that it will ensure: (1) review based on a proper
administrative record; (2) uniformity in decision making and fact
finding; and (3) proper utilization of "the agency's expertise." 3
85 See United States v Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equipment, 169 F3d 548,
551-54 (8th Cir 1999) ("Fried").
86 Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 462-63.
87 Id at 463, quoting Southwestern Bell Telephone Co v Arkansas Public Service Commis-
sion, 738 F2d 901, 906 (8th Cir 1984), vacd 106 S Ct 2885 (1986).
88 Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 463.
89 466 US 463 (1984).
90 Id at 468. See also Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 463.
91 See Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 463 ("Where exclusive jurisdiction is mandated by stat-
ute, a party cannot bypass the procedure by characterizing its position as a defense to an en-
forcement action."), quoting Southwestern Bell Telephone, 738 F2d at 906.
92 Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 463.
93 Id.
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Despite the Eighth Circuit's reversal of its initial position, the
possibility of jurisdiction over the challenges at issue was not entirely
foreclosed; the district court might have jurisdiction "[i]f Fried had no
way of obtaining judicial review of the regulations."' Despite this ca-
veat, however, the court still came out strongly against district court
jurisdiction over constitutional defenses to FCC forfeiture actions.9'
B. The Sixth Circuit
In Maquina Musical, the Sixth Circuit held that district courts
have jurisdiction to hear constitutional defenses to FCC forfeiture ac-
tions.6 Maquina Musical is actually a consolidation of two in rem for-
feiture actions, the first against Rick Strawcutter and the second
against Maquina Musical. The relevant case, against Maquina Musical,
involved a signal emitted by an unlicensed radio station. The FCC in-
formed the president of Maquina of the violations.' When Maquina
did not stop, the Government filed a complaint seeking forfeiture and
proceeded to arrest the equipment. In response, Maquina sought a
temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, "a dismissal of
the government's forfeiture complaint for lack of subject matter juris-
diction, and an order quashing the in rem arrest warrant."" The tem-
porary restraining order was denied in a separate hearing. "' In the
opinion forming the basis of the appeal, the district court addressed
Maquina's defense that the FCC regulations were unconstitutional.'
Maquina claimed that "the moratorium on Class D licenses,
[which applied to microbroadcasters], was an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech.""'2 The district court, however, found that "it
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Maquina Musical's constitutional de-
fenses because 28 U.S.C. § 2342 provides that the courts of appeals
94 Id.
95 See id. See also United States v Neset, 235 F3d 415, 418-21 (8th Cir 2000) (extending
Laurel Avenue to actions for injunctive relief).
96 See Maquina Musical, 204 F3d at 666-67.
97 Id at 663.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 United States v Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equipment, 29 F Supp 2d 393,
395 (ED Mich 1998) ("West Vernor Highway").
101 Id at 397-98.
102 Maquina Musical, 204 F3d at 666. The language used by the court to describe Maqui-
na's challenge indicates that it was a general challenge to the regulations. The court states that
the regulations were challenged as a general "restraint on speech," rather than a specific re-
straint on Maquina's speech. Id. See also West Vernor Highway, 29 F Supp 2d at 397.
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have exclusive jurisdiction 'to enjoin, set aside, suspend ... or to de-
termine the validity of... all final orders of the [FCC]."'
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, relying on statutory
construction and legislative intent. It found that the district court had
jurisdiction over constitutional defenses "for the simple reason that
no FCC order [was] being challenged. '' .. In asserting this, the court
approvingly cited the reasoning in the Eighth Circuit's first Laurel
Avenue decision."5 The court was apparently unaware of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Columbia Broadcasting System, which
held that regulations are orders under § 402, as the case is not dis-
cussed in the opinion. According to the court, it simply did not make
sense for the statute to grant forfeiture jurisdiction to the district
court but surreptitiously remove jurisdiction over certain defenses.
Beyond this appeal to common sense, the court argued that the qua-
si-criminal nature of forfeiture made it unlikely that Congress would
have denied defendants the ability to raise constitutional defenses. '
Congress could have explicitly "excluded certain defenses" but did
not." As such, the court found it unlikely "that Congress [would
have] enacted a statute that allow[ed] the government to forfeit a
person's property while denying the owner the right to defend him-
self by challenging the legal basis of the government's forfeiture
case.'""
Subsequent forfeiture cases have pointed out that Maquina Musi-
cal relied on an overturned version of Laurel Avenue."° Nevertheless,
Sixth Circuit cases since Maquina Musical have confirmed its continu-
ing viability in forfeiture situations."" Further, these cases also indicate
that the applicability of Maquina Musical's holding depends upon
whether the FCC is pursuing forfeiture and not on the particular type
of constitutional challenge the defendant is raising. 1'
103 See Maquina Musical, 204 F3d at 667 (alterations in original).
104 Id (quotation marks omitted).
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 Maquina Musical, 204 F3d at 667.
108 Id.
109 See, for example, Prayze FM v FCC, 214 F3d 245, 250-51 (2d Cir 2000).
110 See, for example, United States v Szoka, 260 F3d 516, 526-28 (6th Cir 2001) (treating
Maquina Musical as good law but declining to extend it to actions in which the government
seeks an injunction to enforce an administrative cease and desist order); La Voz Radio de la
Communidad v FCC, 223 F3d 313, 319-20 (6th Cir 2000) (distinguishing between the use of
constitutional arguments as a shield, as in Maquina Musical, and the use of such arguments as a
"sword against the possibility of adverse administrative action in the future," as in the case be-
fore the court).
111 See La Voz, 223 F3d at 319-20 (distinguishing Maquina Musical based on the action
the FCC was bringing).
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C. The Other Circuits
Other circuits have yet to take a firm position on jurisdiction
over constitutional defenses in FCC forfeiture actions. The Ninth
and DC Circuits have come the closest, indicating sympathy with the
Eighth and Sixth Circuits, respectively. The Second Circuit has indi-
cated awareness of the issue.
1. Recent cases in the Ninth Circuit lean toward the Eighth
Circuit's holding, but earlier cases pull it toward the Sixth
Circuit's.
In United States v Dunifer,"2 the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Eighth Circuit's general jurisdictional holding."3 Dunifer, however,
was not a forfeiture proceeding. It dealt with injunctive relief and the
injunction jurisdiction provision found in § 401(a), and it involved
forfeiture only in the background facts."' The FCC was seeking to
enjoin Dunifer from broadcasting under 47 USC § 301, "which pro-
hibits the operation of a radio station without [an FCC license]."'"
Prior to the § 301 action, the FCC sent "a Notice of Apparent Liabil-
ity for a monetary forfeiture of $20,000.'' After the FCC rejected
Dunifer's constitutional arguments, the district court heard argu-
ments to enjoin Dunifer from broadcasting and found that it had
subject matter jurisdiction "under the applicable statutory scheme to
hear [the] arguments concerning the unconstitutionality of the regu-
lations.""7 Neither the district court nor the appellate court claimed
to be construing the forfeiture provisions. Indeed, the appellate court
specifically distinguished Dunifer from forfeiture cases."8 Despite uti-
lizing the language of Laurel Avenue, Dunifer does not deal with for-
feiture. This case, however, is still useful for divining how the Ninth
Circuit might view forfeiture cases.
The Ninth Circuit found that the lower court did not have juris-
diction to hear constitutional defenses. The court admitted that nor-
mally "the district courts would have subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain constitutional and statutory defenses to an injunctive ac-
tion."'"9 In this situation, however, § 402(a) granted the appellate
112 219 F3d 1004 (9th Cir 2000).
113 Id at 1006-09.
114 See id at 1005, 1008.
115 Id at 1005.
116 Dunifer, 219 F3d at 1005.
117 Id at 1006.
118 See id at 1007-08.
119 Id at 1006.
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courts jurisdiction to hear such challenges." The court declared that
"[b]y its terms, the Communications Act's jurisdictional limitations
apply as much as to affirmative defenses as to offensive claims."' 121 In
reaching this decision, the court relied heavily on Laurel Avenue and
distinguished Maquina Musical based on precedent.
Although the Ninth Circuit leaned toward the Eighth Circuit's
view in its Dunifer opinion, the status of constitutional defenses to
forfeiture actions in the Ninth Circuit remains unclear. The court
specifically distinguished Dunifer from the 1994 forfeiture case,
Dougan v FCC.'" In Dougan, the Ninth Circuit found that "the 'spe-
cific' jurisdictional grant of § 504(a) to the district courts over forfei-
ture actions trumped the general jurisdictional grant of § 402(a) to
the courts of appeals to review FCC orders," including for constitu-
tional challenges. 4 If Dougan and Dunifer were considered alone,
the Ninth Circuit's position would seem similar to the Sixth Circuit's
position. However, a 2007 District of Oregon case creates some con-
fusion regarding the actual state of the law in the Ninth Circuit. In
United States v TravelCenters of America,'25 the District of Oregon ex-
tended the reasoning in Dunifer to forfeiture and found that it did
not have jurisdiction to consider constitutional defenses in a mone-
tary forfeiture action, stating that "actions which attack the legality
of the Act or its regulations... must be addressed by the appellate
courts.'. 6
2. The DC Circuit has not committed to a position but appears
inclined toward the Sixth Circuit's view.
The DC Circuit has not taken an explicit position on this split,
but dicta in Action for Children's Television v FCC27 indicates sym-
pathy with the Sixth Circuit's view. Children's Television involved in-
terest group "challenges to the [FCC's] scheme for imposing forfei-
tures for the broadcast of indecent material. ' ' "a Specifically, the case
120 Dunifer, 219 F3d at 1007, citing Sable Communications of California, Inc v FCC, 827
F2d 640, 642 (9th Cir 1987).
121 Dunifer, 219 F3d at 1007.
122 Id.
123 21 F3d 1488 (9th Cir 1994).
124 Dunifer, 219 F3d at 1007-08.
125 597 F Supp 2d 1222 (D Or 2007).
126 Id at 1226-27. See also Minority Television Project Inc v FCC, 2007 WL 781974, *5
(ND Cal) (finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to regula-
tions in a monetary forfeiture action).
127 59 F3d 1249 (DC Cir 1995).
128 Id at 1252.
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addressed constitutional challenges to the forfeiture statute.12 The
court noted that an earlier case had found that "where a statute
commits final agency action to review by the Court of Appeals, the
appellate court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear suits seeking relief
that might affect its future statutory power of review. 13. In this case,
however, the district court had found "a general exception... for
constitutional claims."' The court commented on the issue but did
not resolve it. It explained that district court jurisdiction over the
constitutional challenge to the forfeiture statute in this particular
case was no threat to appellate jurisdiction.'32 Specifically, the court
said, somewhat opaquely, that because the district court had jurisdic-
tion over the forfeiture actions, it had jurisdiction over challenges to
the forfeiture statute.1 3
While the DC Circuit's position was established before Maquina
Musical, the court indicates openness to the Sixth Circuit's position.
This openness is further supported by another case that emphasized
the exclusiveness of district court jurisdiction over forfeiture actions.'"
3. The Second Circuit has commented on the jurisdictional
issue but has not fully committed to a position.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Prayze FM v FCC" contained ev-
idence that the court is inclined toward the position of the Sixth Cir-
cuit.' Prayze did not address forfeiture but dealt with constitutional
challenges to FCC directives as part of an action for a preliminary in-
junction.' The court recognized the jurisdictional uncertainty but
chose not to settle the issue because "the FCC has sufficiently demon-
strated that-in the current posture of the case- it would likely pre-
vail.'' Where the district court had rejected the plaintiff's constitu-
tional challenges wholesale for lack of standing, however, the Second
Circuit ignored the jurisdictional issue and found that the plaintiff did
129 See id at 1255-56.
130 Id at 1256, quoting Telecommunications Research and Action Center v FCC, 750 F2d
70, 72 (DC Cir 1984) ("TRAC I").
131 Children's Television, 59 F3d at 1256, quoting TRACI, 750 F2d at 72.
132 Children's Television, 59 F3d at 1256.
133 Id ("In other words, the district court's jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' challenge to the
constitutionality of the forfeiture statute is no threat to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals
because review of a Commission order imposing a forfeiture (in the defense against a collec-
tion suit) would itself be in the district court, not in the court of appeals.").
134 See Pleasant Broadcasting Company v FCC, 564 F2d 496, 500-02 (DC Cir 1977).
135 214 F3d 245 (2d Cir 2000).
136 Id at 250-51.
137 Id at 247-48.
138 Id at 251-52.
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"have standing to bring a facial challenge to the regulations.. 3. While
Prayze was a dispute over an injunction, the court's reasoning, in addi-
tion to the reasoning in some district court cases,'" suggests that the
Second Circuit might be open to district court jurisdiction over consti-
tutional defenses.
III. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION
Notwithstanding the current constellation of confusing deci-
sions, there is an evenhanded solution to the circuit split rooted in
careful statutory construction: Under the Act, district courts can hear
certain constitutional challenges to FCC directives as affirmative de-
fenses to forfeiture actions. More precisely, they can hear as-applied
constitutional defenses but not facial constitutional defenses. It is
important to recall at this point that the split, and the solution pre-
sented, concern challenges to the constitutionality of the underlying
regulation and not to either the actual seizure of the property or the
statute.
This solution is novel, but it builds on intuitions and principles
from existing law. Importantly, the notion of splitting constitutional
challenges to solve the jurisdictional issue is suggested by cases that
have analyzed similar challenges in non-FCC contexts. This solution
is also supported by the structure of the Communications Act. Fur-
thermore, the solution reduces the tension between the various ju-
risdictional grants and addresses the concerns raised by the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits.
This Part proceeds in two steps. First, it analyzes the statutory
provisions controlling forfeiture jurisdiction and appellate jurisdic-
tion. Second, it argues that splitting the constitutional defenses that
the district court can hear is the best way to resolve the current cir-
cuit split.
A. Analysis of the Statutory Grants of Forfeiture Jurisdiction
Even a close examination of the statutory language fails to re-
solve the circuit split. The forfeiture provisions do not provide an an-
swer to the issue since defenses (constitutional or otherwise) are simp-
ly not discussed. Even if one considers the forfeiture provisions in light
of § 402's grant of appellate jurisdiction, a solution remains elusive.
139 Prayze, 214 F3d at 251.
140 See, for example, United States v Any and All Radio Station Equipment, 93 F Supp 2d
414, 420-21 (SDNY 2000) (considering whether an FCC regulation violated the First Amend-
ment without discussing jurisdictional issues).
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One might argue that the issue is really quite simple: Section 402
grants the appellate courts jurisdiction over challenges to FCC regu-
lations. It is the beginning and end of the issue. But the language of
§ 402 is consistent with the intuition that, given district court jurisdic-
tion over forfeiture cases, district courts should have jurisdiction
over constitutional defenses raised in those cases. Indeed, courts
have hesitated mightily before reading a statute to completely divest
district courts of jurisdiction over either constitutional challenges or
affirmative defenses, even where a jurisdictional bar is otherwise op-
erative. 4' Furthermore, seemingly clear provisions of the Communi-
cations Act itself have proven to be quite accommodating when im-
portant countervailing considerations are present.
As such, to simply conclude that § 402 solves the split is an over-
ly hasty position that fails to adequately account for the nuances of
the jurisdictional issue. Above all, the analysis demonstrates that the
jurisdictional provisions are inconclusive; they neither provide a
clear answer as to the status of constitutional defenses nor indicate
where to draw the jurisdictional line between the district court and
the appellate court when forfeitures are involved.
1. There are no internal limitations on FCC forfeiture
jurisdiction other than those specifically enumerated by the
statute.
Standing alone, the forfeiture provisions do not explain how
courts should treat constitutional defenses. Instead, they appear to
grant broad jurisdiction to the district court, encumbered only by a
few, clearly articulated conditions. According to § 504, forfeitures
"shall be recoverable.., in a civil suit in the name of the United
States brought in the district where the person or carrier has its prin-
cipal operating office or in any district through which the line or sys-
tem of the carrier runs."'42
This grant is subject to three provisos. First, the jurisdictional
grant explicitly accounts for the optional administrative forfeiture
process that § 503 creates.' 3 Second, all trials under the provision are
141 See Part III.A.2.b.
142 47 USC § 504(a).
143 47 USC § 504(a) (granting jurisdiction "except as otherwise provided with respect to a
forfeiture penalty determined under section 503(b)(3) of this title"). See also 47 USC
§ 503(b)(3) (setting forth an administrative review process).
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to be de novo.'" Third, the provision elucidates special rules for for-
feiture involving ships. "5
Similarly, § 510 states that forfeiture of communications devices
shall be effectuated "upon process issued pursuant to the supple-
mental rules for certain admiralty and maritime claims by any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction over the property."''"
The statute qualifies this in cases where the "seizure is incident to a
lawful arrest.' '..
The presence of these explicit provisos strongly suggests that
Congress knew how to qualify, limit, and channel forfeiture jurisdic-
tion and declined to do so in the case of constitutional challenges.'
This, in turn, suggests a particular way of framing the statutory inter-
pretation issue: The enumerated qualifications attached to the forfei-
ture provisions should be seen as the sole internal conditions on the
jurisdictional grant. Simply put, the provisions grant broad jurisdic-
tion to the district courts over forfeiture actions and are not subject
to an implicit internal limitation on constitutional defenses.
The general grant of forfeiture jurisdiction, 28 USC § 1355, is
consistent with this conclusion. While cases specifically addressing
constitutional challenges under § 1355 are uncommon, there are sit-
uations in which claimants put forward broad constitutional defenses
and a court with jurisdiction under § 1355 considered them without
issue."' Additionally, the language of the statute is absolute: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts
of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or en-
forcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,
144 47 USC § 504(a) ("[A]ny suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo.").
145 47 USC § 504(a) ("[I]n the case of forfeiture by a ship, said forfeiture may also be re-
coverable by way of libel in any district in which such ship shall arrive or depart.").
146 47 USC § 510(b).
147 47 USC § 510(b).
148 When Congress sets forth different items that are members of an "associated group,"
it may be justifiable to draw an inference that items not mentioned were "excluded by deliber-
ate choice, not inadvertence." Barnhart v Peabody Coal Co, 537 US 149, 168-69 (2003) (quota-
tion marks omitted). While the forfeiture jurisdiction provisions are not a traditional statutory
list, the same principle applies because Congress specifically addressed some issues and left
others untouched.
149 See, for example, United States v 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets (Brotogeris Ver-
sicolorus), 689 F Supp 1106, 1109, 1119-20 (SD Fla 1988) (addressing the claimant's constitu-
tional challenges to the Lacey Act as part of a forfeiture proceeding and finding jurisdiction
under 28 USC § 1355); United States v Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F Supp 232, 233, 250 (D Md
1987) (ruling on a constitutional challenge to the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in a
forfeiture proceeding and holding that the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1355).
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incurred under any Act of Congress."'5 This absolute language
strongly supports an inference of generally sweeping jurisdiction,
which would naturally extend to defenses. In general, then, the dis-
trict courts can hear the full range of defenses that a defendant might
bring against a forfeiture action, including constitutional challenges.
Finally, district courts generally have wide jurisdiction over the
challenges that come their way. As the Ninth Circuit recognized,
"[o]rdinarily, the district courts [ ] have subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain constitutional and statutory defenses.' 5' There is no gen-
eral prohibition on the ability of district courts to hear the spectrum
of defenses that a party could raise.''2
This reasoning does not mean that the forfeiture provisions re-
main unaffected by other jurisdictional provisions in the Communi-
cations Act. If the current split indicates anything, it is that the for-
feiture provisions do not exist in a vacuum-they are shaped and
interpreted in light of other parts of the statute. Given that these
provisions do not reveal a solution to the constitutional defenses is-
sue, the next step is to explore whether § 402-the grant of appellate
jurisdiction -provides any guidance.
2. Section 402's language does not resolve the forfeiture issue.
At first glance, the Eighth Circuit's logic appears well founded:
the statute states that the appellate courts generally have jurisdiction
over challenges to rules and regulations, end of story. But this con-
clusion totally discounts the intuition, expressed by the Sixth Circuit,
that district courts should have jurisdiction over constitutional de-
fenses and that Congress would have made it eminently clear if it the
case were otherwise.'53 Indeed, something seems amiss when a district
court with proper jurisdiction is unable to hear constitutional defens-
es raised during the course of a proceeding to relieve a defendant of
his property.
More importantly, the case law confirms this intuition. First,
precedent indicates that district courts can retain jurisdiction over con-
stitutional issues even in the face of other jurisdictional bars. Second,
150 28 USC § 1355(a) (emphasis added) (limiting district court jurisdiction only with re-
spect to matters within the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under 47 USC
§ 1582).
151 Dunifer, 219 F3d at 1006. See also Children's Television, 59 F3d at 1256 (suggesting
that district courts generally have wide jurisdiction over constitutional challenges in the context
of a challenge to a statute).
152 See 28 USC § 1331 (granting broad federal question jurisdiction to district courts with-
out limiting the types of defenses that can be heard).
153 See Maquina Musical, 204 F3d at 667.
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there is a line of cases finding that otherwise applicable jurisdictional
bars do not block a district court from hearing affirmative defenses to
claims brought by the Government. Finally, even within the context of
the Communications Act itself there have been cases where seemingly
absolute language gave way to a constitutional challenge.
a) Judicial reticence to decline jurisdiction over constitutional
claims even when faced with jurisdictional bars. Precedent confirms
the core of the Sixth Circuit's intuition: district courts can retain
some residuum of jurisdiction over constitutional issues even if there
are other jurisdictional barriers. On a broad level, District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals v Feldman"' suggested that district court juris-
diction can be molded to retain review of certain constitutional chal-
lenges even in the face of a broad jurisdictional bar. In Feldman, the
Supreme Court found that while district courts lacked jurisdiction to
consider "a state court's final judgment in a bar admission matter,"
they could hear "a general challenge to the constitutionality" of bar
admission rules."'
Other cases suggest that similar jurisdictional shaping is general-
ly acceptable. In McNary v Haitian Refugee Center, Inc,"' the re-
spondents brought constitutional challenges to Immigration and
Naturalization Service practices in administering a special agricultur-
al workers program."' The petitioners argued that the plain language
of the Immigration and Nationality Act"' barred district court juris-
diction over such challenges."9 The Court, however, found room
within the statute to allow district court review of "challenges to un-
constitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing
applications," despite the designated review path for challenges to
certain immigration applications.' '
In Mace v Skinner,"' Mace brought constitutional challenges
against a range of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) practices,
including that they "violated Mace's due process and jury trial rights
guaranteed under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion" by revoking his aircraft mechanic's certificate.' 2 The defendants
154 460 US 462 (1983).
155 Id at 483-84.
156 498 US 479 (1991).
157 Id at 487-90.
158 Pub L No 82-414, 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq.
159 McNary, 498 US at 491-92.
160 Id at 491-94 (noting, among other things, that Congress could have used broader statu-
tory language if it sought to bar challenges to the agency's procedures).
161 34 F3d 854 (9th Cir 1994).
162 Id at 856.
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argued that Mace "cannot attack the constitutionality of agency ac-
tions or procedures in district court, because only appellate courts
have the limited jurisdiction to review those agency actions.' ' 3 Despite
this argument, the Ninth Circuit recognized a carve-out for district
court review of certain constitutional claims, including Mace's, in con-
struing § 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,"M which grants the
circuit courts jurisdiction over orders of the FAA.'"
Finally, several cases involving the Federal Trade Commission
have also created a broader jurisdictional space for the district courts.
Courts have recognized that the "statutory provisions covering review
by courts of appeals do not in and of themselves preclude District
Court jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances," including constitu-
tional claims that the Federal Trade Commission was violating due
process." Jurisdiction for such claims is found under "the general eq-
uity jurisdiction of the court" when the "agency [has] stepped so plain-
ly beyond the bounds of its authority. '167
Of course, the simple presence of a constitutional challenge is
not enough to automatically invoke district court jurisdiction where
it is otherwise barred." Nevertheless, these cases indicate that when
important countervailing considerations are present-equity, irrepa-
rable harm, or judicial expertise, for example-district court jurisdic-
tion over constitutional challenges can be shaped to accommodate
statutory grants of jurisdiction, even if there is no specific grant to
the district court.
b) Jurisdictional bars and defenses to government action. Case
law also suggests caution should be exercised in depriving district
courts of their ability to hear affirmative defenses to claims brought by
the government. In National Union Fire Ins Co of Pittsburgh v City
163 Id at 858.
164 Pub L No 85-726, 72 Stat 731, 795-96.
165 Mace, 34 F3d at 857, 859-60.
166 R.H. Macy & Co v Tinley, 249 F Supp 778, 782 (DDC 1965). See also Pepsico, Inc v FTC,
343 F Supp 396, 399 (SDNY 1972) (noting that courts have allowed district court review when an
agency "has very clearly violated an important constitutional right"); Coca-Cola Co v FTC, 342 F
Supp 670, 675-77 (ND Ga 1972) (explaining four narrow exceptions to the provision barring dis-
trict court review of agency action, including an exception for when a constitutional right has been
violated); Knoll Associates, Inc v Dixon, 232 F Supp 283, 285 (SDNY 1964) (stating that the dis-
trict court "should not hesitate to step in" if the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated de-
spite the jurisdictional bar on district court review of agency action).
167 Tinley, 249 F Supp at 782 (arguing that the district court's equity jurisdiction does not
disappear just because the petitioner can later obtain appellate review of the final order).
168 See Thunder Basin Coal Co v Reich, 510 US 200, 215 (1994) (declining to extend dis-
trict court jurisdiction because the petitioner could obtain adequate review of its constitutional
claim through the statutory review scheme).
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Savings, F.S.B.,"I the Third Circuit reversed a district court determina-
tion that the court did not have jurisdiction over affirmative defenses
raised to a claim made by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). '
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989' (FIRREA) barred the courts from hearing "any claim or action
for payment from... the assets of any depository institution for which
the [RTC] has been appointed receiver.". 2 The circuit court, however,
determined that this provision did not bar affirmative defenses to such
claims made by the RTC.
As part of its discussion, the court observed that "interpreting
the jurisdictional bar [to block affirmative defenses] would ... result
in an unconstitutional deprivation of due process. Property which
one stands to lose as a result of a lawsuit is a property interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause." ' 3 To be clear, the court's due
process argument is quite general-it is not tied to the specific con-
text of the RTC. Rather, the argument points out that there is a gen-
eral constitutional deficiency in depriving an individual of affirma-
tive defenses when their property is threatened. The court also
pointed out that even though "parties could always file potential de-
fenses and affirmative defenses in [an] administrative claims proce-
dure," such a path would not be "tenable. ' .. The court reasoned that
even if a party knew that she had to submit her challenges through an
alternate process, it would be nearly impossible, as she "cannot know
what her defense is until she hears the claim leveled against her."'.
The Third Circuit was not alone in following this path-the
Ninth,'6 Tenth,"' and Eleventh'' Circuits all found that FIRREA's ju-
risdictional bar did not operate to block affirmative defenses. While the
correlation between these cases and the Communications Act is not
perfect, the similarities are striking. Both situations involve seemingly
complete statutory bars, an affirmative defense against a government
169 28 F3d 376 (3d Cir 1994).
170 Id at 392-95.
171 Pub L No 101-73, 103 Stat 183, codified as amended at 12 USC § 1811 et seq.
172 National Union, 28 F3d at 393, citing 12 USC § 1821(d)(13)(D).
173 National Union, 28 F3d at 394.
174 Id at 395 (noting that the administrative process does not ensure that the defendants
would get timely notice or would be apprised of the claims leveled against them before they
had to submit their defenses).
175 Id.
176 See Resolution Trust Corp v Midwest Federal Savings Bank of Minot, 36 F3d 785, 790-
93 (9th Cir 1993).
177 See Resolution Trust Corp v Love, 36 F3d 972, 975-78 (10th Cir 1994).
178 See American First Federal, Inc v Lake Forest Park, Inc, 198 F3d 1259, 1262-65 (11th
Cir 1999).
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claim, and, perhaps most importantly, the potential deprivation of a
property interest.
c) Flexibility in the Communications Act. Finally, lest one be-
lieve that the Communications Act is immune from such jurisdic-
tional tinkering, there are several cases-in addition to Maquina
Musical-that demonstrate the Act's flexibility. In New York State
Broadcasters Association, Inc v United States,"' the plaintiffs chal-
lenged an FCC declaratory ruling under § 402. The Government ar-
gued that "petitioners are precluded from making their constitution-
al arguments... because they were not presented to the [FCC]
either in the first instance or in a petition for reconsideration" and
jurisdiction was barred under 47 USC § 405.'" The court acknowl-
edged "that the literal words of section 405 provide for no excep-
tion.. 8' Nevertheless, it still found that the circumstances of the case
absolved the petitioners from the precise strictures of § 405. "
Additionally, in Washington Association for Television and
Children v FCC'" the DC Circuit found that, despite the clear lan-
guage of § 405, implied exceptions exist." It noted that the "tradi-
tionally recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine" applied to
§ 405 and, interestingly, that "[o]ther exceptions may also exist.""
While these cases did not construe § 402 or the forfeiture provi-
sions, they do demonstrate that the Communications Act is flexible.
Even the clearer provisions of the Act are not immune from being
balanced against an array of other concerns. Ultimately, simply declar-
ing that "the provision is clear" is inadequate when important coun-
tervailing considerations are present.
Taken together, these cases indicate discomfort with divesting a
district court of jurisdiction over affirmative defenses and constitutional
challenges, even in the face of apparently applicable jurisdictional bars.
179 414 F2d 990 (2d Cir 1969).
180 Id at 994.
181 Id.
182 Specifically, the petitioners were asking the court to review an FCC declaratory ruling
determining whether broadcasts of the New York State Lottery would violate 18 USC § 1304
without having raised the constitutional issue during the initial proceeding before the FCC or
having asked the FCC to reconsider the ruling, as § 405 requires. Id at 991, 994. The court
found that, given that a separate provision was involved and that the FCC was unable or un-
likely to declare § 1304 unconstitutional, § 405 did not bar jurisdiction. See id at 994.
183 712 F2d 677 (DC Cir 1983).
184 Id at 680-82.
185 Id at 682. The exhaustion doctrine states that "claims not presented to the agency may
not be made for the first time to a reviewing court." Id at 680.
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In the situation presented by the circuit split, not only is there a consti-
tutional challenge to regulations and an affirmative defense involved,
there is also a specific grant of jurisdiction to the district courts. While
these cases do not definitively signify that the district courts should have
full jurisdiction over all defenses, they do show that the facially obvious
meaning of § 402 does not settle the issue. The language of § 402 might
be broad, but there is also a clear grant of jurisdiction to the district
courts and a clear inclination to hesitate before depriving district courts
of the ability to hear constitutional defenses. Ultimately, the jurisdic-
tional provisions themselves provide no way of alleviating this tension.
B. A Constitutional Approach
Even with the interpretive leeway granted by the ambiguous
provisions, the Eighth and Sixth Circuits' approaches are analytically
unsatisfactory. Neither circuit adequately addresses the tension that
exists between the jurisdictional grants. The Eighth Circuit dismisses
any claims of jurisdiction by the district courts based on an excessive-
ly hasty and overly literal reading of the appellate jurisdiction provi-
sions of the statute.'" The Sixth Circuit recognizes the intuitive force
behind granting jurisdiction but fails to back up the intuition with
case law and, more egregiously, disregards the importance of § 4 0 2 ."7
Both approaches are overly blunt.
There is a distinction, however, that went unnoticed by the
Eighth and Sixth Circuits: Constitutional challenges can be split into
as-applied and facial challenges." This division, in turn, suggests a
solution to the forfeiture issue-courts can allow forfeiture defend-
ants to raise as-applied constitutional defenses to FCC directives in
district court but bar facial constitutional defenses.
1. Facial versus as-applied constitutional challenges.
Facial constitutional challenges are challenges in which a party
seeks a declaration that some government instruction-whether a
186 See Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 462-63.
187 See Maquina Musical, 204 F3d at 667-68.
188 The Second and DC Circuits mention this distinction but do not apply it to the juris-
dictional issue. See, for example, Prayze, 214 F3d at 251-52 (distinguishing between facial and
as-applied challenges for the purpose of determining standing); Children's Television, 59 F3d at
1256, 1259-60. Some district courts also mention the distinction but do not use it to resolve the
jurisdictional issue. See, for example, Minority Television Project Inc v FCC, 2007 WL 781974,
*4-5 (ND Cal) (dismissing facial and as-applied challenges in the same sentence); United States
v Evergreen Media Corp of Chicago, AM, 832 F Supp 1183, 1184-86 (ND 111 1993) (finding that
the court had jurisdiction over both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the forfei-
ture provisions of the statute).
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statute, regulation, or rule-is invalid in its entirety. ' Simply put, the
party argues that the instruction itself is generally unconstitutional,
regardless of its application. It is a difficult challenge to bring be-
cause the party must demonstrate that "no set of circumstances ex-
ists under which the [instruction] would be valid."'
In contrast, as-applied constitutional challenges are challenges
in which a party seeks a declaration that a Government instruction is
invalid as applied to that party.' The party contends only that the in-
struction is unconstitutional in the particular context of the case and
not that the instruction is generally invalid or that it has no valid ap-
plications. The difference between the two challenges is important,
as the Government's ability to enforce the instruction changes de-
pending on the challenge. If a facial challenge is successful, the Gov-
ernment cannot enforce the instruction at all." If an as-applied chal-
lenge is successful, the Government "may enforce the [instruction] in
different circumstances......
The distinction between as-applied and facial challenges is not
entirely clear; there is a degree of pliability that can make the con-
tours difficult to determine. This is not to say the distinction is aca-
demic, as the difference between as-applied and facial challenges is
important and can determine the breadth of courts' jurisdiction in
particular cases. Nevertheless, two areas of uncertainty are im-
portant to clarify: first, the scope of an as-applied challenge and, se-
cond, whether the court or the claimant determines whether a chal-
lenge is facial or as-applied.
a) The scope of an as-applied challenge. An issue underlying
the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges is the precise
scope of the challenge. An as-applied challenge is ostensibly limited
to the claimant bringing the challenge. In many cases, however, the
results of such challenges apply to cases beyond that of the individual
claimant." An important question, therefore, is whether a challenge
that implicates the validity of a government directive as applied to a
discrete group is still an as-applied challenge. Recent cases indicate
189 See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan L Rev
235, 236 (1994).
190 United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 (1987).
191 Dorf, 46 Stan L Rev at 236 (cited in note 189).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See, for example, John Doe #1 v Reed, 130 S Ct 2811, 2817 (2010) (stating that plain-
tiffs' challenge to Washington's Public Records Act as applied to referendum petitions general-
ly had characteristics of both as-applied and facial challenges); Citizens United v FEC, 130 S Ct
876, 892-93 (2010) (declining to resolve the case based on as-applied challenges because the
Court could not do so without chilling political speech).
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that when a claimant brings a challenge that implicates parties be-
yond that of the claimant before the court, the challenge is to be
treated as a facial challenge.'" It is worth noting, however, that there
are certain circumstances in which the court itself might decide to go
beyond the party bringing the as-applied challenge and declare a
government instruction invalid as applied to a defined group.'" Nev-
ertheless, as a general matter, as-applied challenges are narrow-
they only include those challenges that involve the specific set of cir-
cumstances applicable to the particular claimant before the court.'"
b) Determining whether a challenge is as-applied. Intimately
connected with the scope issue is determining whether a particular chal-
lenge is as-applied or facial. Or, put differently, how does a court de-
termine whether a particular challenge is aimed solely at the individual
195 See, for example, Doe, 130 S Ct at 2817 ("The label is not what matters. The important
point is that plaintiffs' claim and the relief that would follow ... reach beyond the particular
circumstances of these plaintiffs. They must therefore satisfy our standards for a facial chal-
lenge to the extent of that reach."); Croft v Perry, 624 F3d 157, 164 (5th Cir 2010) (classifying
plaintiffs' claims as facial challenges because they were not limited to the particular circum-
stances of the plaintiffs); Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc v United States, 674 F3d 509,
522 (6th Cir 2012) (finding that the plaintiffs' claims were properly reviewed as facial challeng-
es because the relief would reach beyond the plaintiffs, even though the plaintiffs labelled their
claims as both facial and as-applied); Asgeirsson v Abbot, 773 F Supp 2d 684, 693 (WD Tex
2011). See also Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 892-93.
196 See FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc, 551 US 449, 469-70 (2007) (positing that the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 was invalid as applied to advertisements that did not
meet the articulated standard).
197 See, for example, Foti v City of Menlo Park, 146 F3d 629, 635 (9th Cir 1998) ("An as-
applied challenge does not implicate the enforcement of the law against third parties."); Frye v
City of Kannapolis, 109 F Supp 2d 436, 439 (MD NC 1999) ("[I]f successful in an as-applied
claim the plaintiff may enjoin enforcement of the statute only against himself or herself in the
objectionable manner."); Constitutional Law, 16 Corpus Juris Secundum § 187 (West 2012):
An "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is evaluated consider-
ing how it operates in practice against the particular litigant and under the facts of
the instant case, not hypothetical facts in other situations. The U.S. Supreme Court
is reluctant to invalidate legislation on the basis of its hypothetical application to sit-
uations not before the Court.
But see Nathaniel Persily and Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing
Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election
Law Decisions, 93 Minn L Rev 1644, 1647, 1673 (2009) (asserting that an as-applied challenge
can lead to relief for the plaintiff and many others similarly situated). The broad interpretation
of as-applied challenges forwarded in this article does not appear correct, however. First, the
treatise it cites for the broad relief proposition does not indicate that as-applied challenges in-
clude those who are "similarly situated." Id at 1646-47. Instead, the treatise only indicates that
as-applied challenges in any particular case are limited to the parties before the court, but the
treatise does not say that holdings in such cases cannot provide precedent for use in later cases.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1081 (Foundation 16th ed
2007). Second, the part of Wisconsin Right to Life cited by the article does not appear to be
part of the Court's holding, but instead a part of Chief Justice John Roberts's opinion that only
Justice Samuel Alito joined. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 US at 469-70.
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standing before the court or if it has a broader sweep? Do courts defer
to the claimant's characterization of the type of claim or do they
have some power to determine the "true" scope of the challenge
themselves?
Courts have expressed a preference for as-applied challenges and
a dislike for the sweeping constitutional issues wrapped up in facial
challenges. Recent Supreme Court cases indicate that both what the
claimant says the challenge is and the remedy that the court is asked to
provide can determine whether a challenge is facial or as-applied.'
Essentially, this means that both courts and claimants have op-
portunities to shape whether a challenge is as-applied or facial. If the
type of challenge is unspecified (for example, if the claimant just
claims that a statute violates the First Amendment without specifying
whether he means to bring an as-applied or facial challenge), the
courts can determine its scope.'" Nevertheless, claimants appear able
to determine which type of challenge they are bringing, to an extent.
Case law indicates that if the party clearly articulates that he is only
interested in challenging a government directive as it is being applied
in his particular circumstances, courts will limit themselves to the facts
before them.2'" Other cases, however, indicate that where a claimant is
less clear and the court thinks that the claimant is seeking a remedy
that would invalidate a governmental directive for entities beyond the
claimant, the court will interpret the challenge as facial."' Creating an
additional wrinkle in this already slippery matrix, Citizens United v
198 See, for example, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, PA v United States, 130 S Ct 1324, 1339
(2010) (accepting the claimant's characterization of their challenge as as-applied); Doe, 130 S
Ct at 2817 (looking at the substance of the claim and the relief requested to determine whether
it is facial or as-applied); Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 888-93 (looking at the inquiry necessary
to adequately settle the claim to determine whether the challenge is as-applied or facial); Unit-
ed States v Carel, 668 F3d 1211, 1217-18 (10th Cir 2011) (explaining that the nature of a chal-
lenge depends on "how the plaintiffs elect to proceed").
199 See, for example, Croft, 624 F3d at 161, 164 (determining that plaintiffs brought a faci-
al challenge where plaintiffs claimed that the Texas pledge of allegiance violated the First
Amendment).
200 See, for example, Milavetz, 130 S Ct at 1339 (agreeing to treat the challenge as an as-
applied challenge after Milavetz so insisted); Carel, 668 F3d at 1216-18:
Because we construe Mr. Carel's challenge to § 16913 as an as-applied challenge, we
address only whether applying § 16913 to the particular circumstances of his case vi-
olates the Constitution and we express no opinion concerning whether § 16913 might
violate the Constitution as it applies to other federal sex offenders.
201 See, for example, Doe, 130 S Ct at 2817 (holding that the challenge must satisfy the
standards of a facial challenge where the parties disagreed about whether the challenge was
facial or as-applied); URI Student Senate v Town of Narragansett, 631 F3d 1, 8-9 & n 5 (1st Cir
2011) (characterizing appellants' constitutional challenges as facial challenges despite plain-
tiffs' varying positions on the issue); Croft, 624 F3d at 163-64.
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FEC °  indicates that if determining the more general validity of a di-
rective is "necessary to resolve a claim," then courts should take the
challenge as a facial challenge." Unfortunately, the line between these
situations is not particularly clear.
Obviously, these "clarifications" create some blurring around
the line between facial and as-applied challenges. More specifically,
they raise the question of what courts should do in situations where a
party is attempting to raise an as-applied challenge but it seems cer-
tain that adjudicating the challenge will implicate the validity of the
government directive more generally. In situations where courts are
faced with an ostensibly as-applied challenge (or where the challenge
is not labeled) it appears that they could go one of three ways. First,
they could limit themselves to the particular facts before them and
ignore possible effects on other potential claimants. That is, they
treat the challenge as a true as-applied challenge. ' Second, they
could declare that the challenge is not a true as-applied challenge be-
cause resolving the issue as the claimant wants would necessarily in-
volve settling it for others."' As such, the claimant has the burden of
supporting a facial challenge (a very hard task)."' Third, they could
determine that a broad remedy is necessary to resolve the claim and,
as such, that they need to consider a facial challenge (this was the
situation in Citizens United'7).
A major factor that determines which direction a court will take
seems to lie in the particularity with which the claimant argues that
his constitutional challenge is as-applied. The clearer it is that he is
only interested in getting an adjudication as it applies to his very par-
ticular circumstances, the more likely it is that a court will similarly
view the claimant's challenge as as-applied. Of course, as Citizens
United points out, claimants cannot simply forbid the court from
considering the facial validity of a government statute-the court is
not eternally bound by the characterization that the claimants give
their own challenges" - but they can help ensure that a challenge is
treated as as-applied by particularly and narrowly tailoring both the
challenge and the relief sought.
Ultimately, this set of considerations probably limits the claim-
ants more than the courts. The courts hold the power to determine
202 130 S Ct 876 (2010).
203 Id at 893.
204 See Milavetz, 130 S Ct at 1339; Carel, 668 F3d at 1217-18.
205 See Doe, 130 S Ct at 2817.
206 See id; United States v Stevens, 130 S Ct 1577, 1587 (2010).
207 See Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 893.
208 See id at 893.
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whether a challenge is as-applied or facial, and they are not limited
by the labels placed on the challenge by claimants. At the same time,
there is an aversion to adjudicating the large constitutional issues
raised by facial challenges unless it is "necessary. ' '2"" As such, if
claimants want to level a successful as-applied challenge and avoid
the difficulties associated with facial challenges, they need to be clear
that they are limiting their challenge to the particular facts presented
in their case.
2. The best way to solve the forfeiture issue is by allowing
district courts to hear as-applied constitutional defenses but
not facial defenses.
The as-applied-facial challenge distinction suggests a solution to
the problem plaguing the circuit courts: under the Communications
Act's forfeiture provisions, district courts have jurisdiction over as-
applied constitutional defenses to FCC regulations but not over faci-
al constitutional defenses. This would not bar facial challenges to
regulations but would merely require that these be heard exclusively
by appellate courts.
This solution-offered by no court to date-sits between the de-
cisions proffered by the Sixth and Eighth Circuits. The Eighth Cir-
cuit would likely reject this solution as too broad. The Sixth Circuit is
more opaque: Maquina Musical is not clear about what type of chal-
lenge the defendant is brought the regulation and the court did not
discuss the distinction. Regardless, this resolution is much narrower
than that advocated by the court."'
But this solution is supported by precedent. The Ninth Circuit case
Preminger v Principi"' involved regulations promulgated by the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs (VA), against which the plaintiffs raised
both facial and as-applied challenges. 2 The district court found that it
had jurisdiction over the latter, but not the former, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed."' In particular, the court maintained that, under 5 USC
§ 703 and general federal question jurisdiction, federal courts retain
broad jurisdiction over constitutional challenges unless Congress has
provided for a specific judicial review path." In this situation, Congress
had given exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to most VA actions to
209 Id at 888-93.
210 See Maquina Musical, 204 F3d at 666-67.
211 422 F3d 815 (9th Cir 2005).
212 Id at 820 (involving a VA regulation that bans partisan activity on VA premises).
213 Id at 820-21.
214 Id at 821.
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the Federal Circuit in 38 USC § 502: "Thus, Congress explicitly has
provided for judicial review of direct challenges to VA rules and regu-
lations only in the Federal Circuit. 2 . Despite this grant of direct review
power and the loss of jurisdiction over facial challenges, the court held
that it "retain[ed] jurisdiction to review an as-applied challenge. The
application of a rule that is deemed to be (or that the Federal Circuit
has held to be) valid to a particular party or individual is neither rule-
making nor an action by the Secretary that requires notice and publica-
tion. 2. 6 In other words, when an agency applies a rule or regulation to a
particular individual, that action is not, in itself, a new rule or regula-
tion that is captured by the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction.
Cases in other circuits corroborate this reasoning. The Fourth
Circuit recognized that district courts can have jurisdiction over as-
applied challenges even if a statutory review process does not allow
jurisdiction over facial challenges.' Additionally, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit found that vesting review of regulations in a specific court di-
vested other courts of jurisdiction over facial constitutional challeng-
es to those regulations."'
The FCC forfeiture cases bear two important similarities to the
VA cases. First, they both involve constitutional challenges to regu-
lations. Second, both involve statutes that provide jurisdictional
paths for judicial review of rules and regulations. Given these strik-
ing similarities, the logic of Preminger is applicable to the forfeiture
cases. The Act grants district courts broad jurisdiction over forfeiture
actions and presumably would grant jurisdiction over constitutional
defenses in the absence of § 402."' Section 402, however, has speci-
fied a particular judicial review path for FCC final orders-direct
challenges to rules, regulations, and other final orders are to be
brought before appellate courts.' Thus, district courts' forfeiture ju-
risdiction over constitutional challenges to FCC regulations brought
as defenses to a forfeiture action is circumscribed. As such, the dis-
trict court is barred from hearing facial defenses that implicate the
validity of an entire FCC directive. Such generalized challenges are
challenges to final orders that are properly within the purview of the
appellate courts. A party would need to bring that challenge before
the FCC and then appeal to the circuit court (unless direct review by
215 Preminger, 422 F3d at 821.
216 Id.
217 See Griffin v Department of Veterans Affairs, 274 F3d 818, 825 (4th Cir 2001). See also
Griffin v Department of Veterans Affairs, 129 F Supp 2d 832, 837-38 (D Md 2001).
218 See Hall v U.S. Department of Veterans'Affairs, 85 F3d 532, 533-35 (11th Cir 1996).
219 See 47 USC § 504(a); Prayze, 214 F3d at 250.
220 See 47 USC § 402(a).
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the appellate court were permitted)." Nevertheless, this does not di-
vest the district court of jurisdiction over as-applied constitutional
defenses that challenge how a directive is being applied to an indi-
vidual in a specific case.
To be clear, this approach is not a pleading solution. It is not a
recommendation that defendants frame their defenses as as-applied
challenges in order to maximize their chances of being heard. Ra-
ther, this approach argues that the Act limits district court forfeiture
jurisdiction to considering only as-applied constitutional defenses
and bars them from hearing facial defenses. Thus, as discussed in
Part III.B.L.b, parties cannot simply plead around the distinction.
Nevertheless, this approach will obviously impact how a defendant
should plead in particular cases and it implicates questions about
how the district court should proceed in light of the slipperiness that
exists at the border of as-applied and facial challenges. It is worth
noting, however, that even were a defendant to plead strategically,
the effect would be minimal. At worst, the defendant would strategi-
cally plead an as-applied challenge, which only affects that particular
defendant. The congressional scheme reserving wholesale review of
rules is still focused on the courts of appeals.
The earlier discussion of as-applied and facial challenges ex-
plored two issues that courts grapple with when addressing constitu-
tional challenges- determining whether a challenge is as-applied or
facial, and determining the scope of as-applied challenges. These
questions arise in a wide range of circumstances, and district courts
will inevitably have to grapple with them when applying the ap-
proach advocated above.
The first major question that a district court would face when con-
fronted with a constitutional defense is determining whether the de-
fendant is bringing an as-applied or facial challenge. On a general lev-
el, the determination process would not be significantly different from
how it is done in any other case involving a constitutional challenge.
Even though district courts are limited to considering as-applied chal-
lenges, the statute imposes no requirements on how a court should de-
termine whether a challenge is as-applied or facial. As such, the gen-
eral jurisprudence surrounding as-applied and facial challenges would
control the determination process-the court would look at the char-
acterization of the defense by the defendant and at what it would need
to do to address the defense."
221 See Part I.D.3.
222 See, for example, Milavetz,130 S Ct at 1339; Doe, 130 S Ct at 2817; Citizens United, 130
S Ct at 888-93.
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The second major question is what the court would do if an os-
tensibly as-applied defense potentially implicates parties not before
the court. As seen in Part III.B.L.b, the court could pursue three
paths. First, it could take the defendant's word at face value, treat
the defense as an as-applied defense, and strictly limit its decision to
his particular circumstances without considering possible effects on
others. This approach is on prominent display in United States v
Carel,2" where the court accepted that the claim was as-applied and
expressly limited itself to the case before it."4 Importantly, this is the
approach that many courts seem to follow." Second, the court could
say that the defense is based on the same claim that anyone else
would raise to challenge the regulation and, as such, constitutes a fa-
cial challenge." Third, the court could say that while the defendant
might want to raise an as-applied defense, proper adjudication of the
defense would necessarily involve considering its general validity."'
As such, the defense is actually a facial challenge. So far, this process
is par for the course as far as constitutional challenges go.
The real difference lies in what happens once the court makes a
determination as to the challenge the claimant is bringing. Normally,
if the court decides that the challenge before it is actually a facial
challenge, it raises the bar for the claimant-the claimant has the
burden of demonstrating that there are no circumstances under
which the government directive in question is constitutionally valid."
Under the solution argued for above, if the district court in a forfei-
ture case follows the second or third approach-or otherwise finds
that the constitutional defense implicates a facial challenge-they
are barred from hearing the defense. Instead, the court essentially
has to tell the defendant to take his constitutional claim to the FCC
or to the appellate courts.
The preceding discussion clearly raises the question of what the
defendant should do to help ensure that his as-applied challenge is
taken as such by the court. As noted, despite the slipperiness be-
tween as-applied and facial challenges, many courts appear to simply
take claims as characterized and explicitly limit their ultimate deter-
minations accordingly. Problems appear to arise when claimants
223 668 F3d 1211 (10th Cir 2011).
224 Id at 1217-18. See also Milavetz, 130 S Ct at 1339 (analyzing the challenge as an as-
applied challenge based on plaintiffs' insistence).
225 See, for example, Preminger, 422 F3d at 820-21 (accepting, without exploration, the
claimant's characterization of the challenge); Prayze, 214 F3d at 250-52 (same).
226 See Doe, 130 S Ct at 2817.
227 See Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 893.
228 See, for example, Doe, 130 S Ct at 2817, citing Stevens, 130 S Ct at 1587. See also note 195.
2012] 1587
The University of Chicago Law Review
frame their challenges broadly and call them "as-applied" or seek
broad relief. As such, the key for a defendant appears to lie in care-
fully circumscribing the scope of their as-applied defense and tying it
to the particular facts of their case.
Ultimately, the balancing act between taking the defense at face
value and looking into whether it is "really" an as-applied defense is
a good thing. It grants the notion of limiting the district courts to as-
applied challenges some real teeth and prevents it from merely be-
coming a matter of switching the words a defendant uses when pre-
senting his defense. More specifically, it grants the district courts a
degree of discretion when considering defenses. As such, it reduces
the chances that a defendant will be able to artfully plead his way out
of the bar on facial challenges. Further, it helps ensure that the dis-
trict court will not rule on the broader validity of the regulation. Fi-
nally, it forces defendants to be particular and narrow in their consti-
tutional challenges.
3. The proposed solution is supported by the language and
structure of the Communications Act.
There are several other important factors that support the solu-
tion advocated above. First, the solution proposed above meshes
well with the provision in § 504 that forfeiture trials are de novo,
which implies that the district court can hear all relevant issues relat-
ed to forfeiture cases before it,229 and the lack of restrictions on the
district court's power to allow forfeiture under § 510.3 Additionally,
the appellate courts retain the broad power over rules and regula-
tions implicated by § 402.
Second, it does not render any provision superfluous. The juris-
dictional provisions both speak categorically; they do not have "re-
lease" clauses that describe circumstances in which they are rendered
inoperative. Yet, under the Eighth and Sixth Circuits' approaches,
either the jurisdiction of the district court or appellate court is unjus-
tifiably impinged upon. That is, the respective jurisdictional provi-
sions are not accorded the weight they are properly due. " Under the
approach articulated above, the appellate courts retain their power
to hear challenges to the validity of final orders and the district
229 47 USC § 504(a). See also Pleasant Broadcasting Co v FCC, 564 F2d 496, 500 (DC Cir
1977) (arguing that § 504(a) clearly affords an opportunity for "full review" in a trial de novo).
230 47 USC § 510(b).
231 See Corley v United States, 556 US 303, 314 (2009) ("A statute should be construed so
that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void
or insignificant.") (quotation marks omitted).
1588 [79:1553
Forfeiture Jurisdiction under the Communications Act
courts retain their power to hear defenses that are relevant to forfei-
ture actions.
Third, this approach does not read text into the statute. It does
not require an implied "except for constitutional defenses" clause in
the forfeiture provisions or an "except if the constitutionality of the
final order is implicated in a forfeiture action" clause in the appellate
provisions. Instead, it takes the statutory language as written and lo-
cates a fair balancing point between the various provisions.
Fourth, this approach is in keeping with the nuanced jurisdic-
tional scheme that the statute creates. Specifically, it would not allow
one jurisdictional grant to override the other (as the interpretations
of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits do) and helps clarify the extent of
both. It gives weight to the complexity of the statute rather than try-
ing to simplify it unnecessarily or in a way Congress did not intend.
Finally, this interpretation meshes well with the Supreme
Court's admonition in ITT and similar cases. In ITT, the Court man-
dated that a litigant could not ask the district court to "enjoin action
that is the outcome of the agency's order. 232 The respondents were
raising the same claims before the district court that they had raised
during their failed rulemaking petition before the FCC. 3 In effect,
they were mounting a surreptitious wholesale attack on the validity
of the FCC's denial of their rulemaking petition-they were not at-
tacking a particular application of that order, but the order in its en-
tirety. Under the scheme presented above, forfeiture defendants
would be barred from mounting similar wholesale attacks on the va-
lidity of FCC directives in their defenses, but would be able to chal-
lenge the application of such directives in their particular cases.
4. Several policy considerations also support this approach.
While the legal reasons presented above lend primary support to
the solution, there are several secondary reasons to adopt this con-
struction of the statute. Namely, it balances the concerns of the cir-
cuits, clarifies the jurisdictional inquiry in a forfeiture action, and il-
luminates the jurisdictional mandate more generally.
232 ITT, 466 US at 468-69. See also Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn v Rederiaktiebo-
lager Transatlantic, 400 US 62, 69-71 (1970) (affirming that the district court did not have jurisdic-
tion to review a Maritime Commission order because it was committed to the appellate courts);
Whitney National Bank in Jefferson Parish v Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co, 379 US 411,421-
23 (1965) (barring the litigants from avoiding statutorily prescribed administrative and appellate
jurisdiction by attacking a Federal Reserve determination in a suit against the Comptroller of the
Currency).
233 ITT, 466 US at 465-69.
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Despite the unsatisfactory analyses in the Eighth and Sixth Cir-
cuits' opinions, both courts raise legitimate concerns about the status
of forfeiture jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit expressed concerns about
short-circuiting appellate court jurisdiction by allowing defendants to
use forfeiture jurisdiction as an evasive mechanism.' The Sixth Circuit
worried about barring constitutional defenses that a defendant would
have access to absent explicit instructions from Congress barring such
defenses." Under the approach presented above, both of these con-
cerns are mitigated. A violator would still have the opportunity to
raise a constitutional defense but in a limited fashion." Additionally,
violators could not utilize forfeiture proceedings to evade the appel-
late courts' jurisdiction. If a defendant sought the wholesale invalida-
tion of a particular FCC directive on constitutional grounds, the de-
fendant would have to follow the procedures laid out in § 402. The
district court would have no jurisdiction over such challenges.
One might contend that standing issues can prevent defendants
from bringing as-applied constitutional defenses, even if a court has
subject matter jurisdiction. This is highly unlikely, as standing applies
to plaintiffs, not defendants.237 Furthermore, even if standing extended
to forfeiture defendants, it would not automatically operate to block
all as-applied defenses. The doctrine is applied on a case-by-case ba-
sis:' where one party might lack standing because he never requested
an FCC license, another party might have standing because he has the
license but violated an FCC rule that applied to his license. And still
another party might have standing absent a license because he success-
fully demonstrated the futility of applying for one." Indeed, in this re-
spect, standing doctrine could be used by a district court to further en-
sure that truly bad-faith defendants do not abuse the court's
jurisdiction. As stated, however, standing is unlikely to be an issue, as
234 See Laurel Avenue, 207 F3d at 463.
235 See Maquina Musical, 204 F3d at 667.
236 See Preminger, 422 F3d at 821.
237 See Wynn v Carey, 599 F2d 193, 196 (7th Cir 1979) ("The standing doctrine, which is
derived from the Article III case or controversy requirements of the Constitution, applies only
to plaintiffs."). See also 32A Am Jur 2d Fed Courts § 591 at 49 (2007) ("The standing require-
ment applies only to plaintiffs and not to parties intervening as defendants."); Francis M.
Dougherty, ed, 14 Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure § 67:75 (West 3d ed 2012) ("The doctrine
of standing applies only to plaintiffs."). Indeed, while the two forfeiture cases in which standing
was utilized against the defendants were both affirmed, they were affirmed on subject matter
jurisdiction grounds and the appellate courts never reached the issue of standing. See United
States v Neset, 235 F3d 415, 420 (8th Cir 2000); Dunifer, 219 F3d at 1005 ("We do not reach the
standing issue because we conclude that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.").
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it does not apply to defendants. Either way, this approach guards
against parties utilizing the district courts to further a constitutional
agenda properly brought before the appellate court.
Additionally, the solution also allows district courts and appel-
late courts to ask better questions about their own jurisdiction when
faced with a forfeiture issue. It directs courts to look at the nature of
the actual defenses that the defendant in a forfeiture action is raising.
This would minimize the time courts spend grappling with the
opaque provisions of a complicated statute. In addition to saving ju-
dicial resources, this approach also encourages a uniform interpreta-
tion of the Act's jurisdictional provisions. While it does not solve
every jurisdictional issue that could arise, the solution brings some
clarity to the Act and is a useful step towards a more coherent un-
derstanding of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Despite the jurisdictional confusion that inheres in the Commu-
nications Act, there is an evenhanded way to resolve the circuit split:
allow district courts jurisdiction over as-applied constitutional chal-
lenges to FCC directives brought as defenses in forfeiture actions but
bar jurisdiction over facial defenses. This approach has a strong legal
foundation-it comports with the statutory language, is supported by
case law addressing regulatory issues, and satisfies Supreme Court
precedent. Importantly, this approach also addresses concerns raised
by the Eighth and Sixth Circuits.
Beyond resolving a long-standing circuit split, this Comment is
important for several additional reasons. As noted, the jurisdictional
provisions of the Communications Act are complicated. Any sliver of
lucidity, however particular, is useful in the battle against the Act's
opacity. More fundamentally, forfeiture strikes at the heart of the sys-
tem of property rights that American law cherishes-it allows the gov-
ernment to take away property without compensation. While few
would question the government's right to exercise this power, its exer-
cise needs to be closely watched. Admittedly, the forfeiture provisions
of the Communications Act describe a rather specific sphere within
which the power operates. At their core, however, the provisions still
allow uncompensated government acquisition of property. Dispensing
with a clarification of those provisions sets a dangerous precedent for
exercises of the forfeiture power. It is essential that those subject to the
Act know how to defend themselves against such actions to the fullest
extent allowable. Anything less is a potentially dangerous expansion of
government power and an affront to individual property rights.
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